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Abstract
In this paper we analyze incentives to invest in capacity prior to a sequence of
Cournot spot markets with varying demand. We compare equilibrium investment in
the absence and in presence of the possibility to trade on forward markets. We ﬁnd
that the access to strategic devices (such as forward contracts as analyzed by Allaz
and Vila (1993), or, equivalently strategic delegation as analyzed by Fershtman and
Judd (1987) or Vickers (1985)) prior to spot market competition reduces equilibrium
investments.
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11 Introduction
Several papers have analyzed the Cournot market game in a broader context, explicitly
accounting for the ﬁrms’ access to commitment devices such as delegation of sales (as
analyzed by Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987)), or the strategic use of forward
contracts (Allaz and Vila (1993)). All those devices allow ﬁrms to commit to a more
aggressive sales strategy which, however, puts them into a prisoner’s dilemma situation: In
equilibrium they voluntarily use the commitment device and end up worse oﬀ than in its
absence. Inspired by those ﬁndings, policy recommendations have been made that aim at
the implementation of appropriate institutions to mitigate market power. For example, in
the electricity sector the introduction of forward markets has been promoted in response
to that literature.1
In this paper we analyze the interdependence between strategic devices as described
above and the ﬁrms’ capacity choices. In our model capacity levels are long run decisions
that aﬀect the ﬁrms’ production possibilities for a certain time interval. That is, after ﬁrms
have chosen their capacities they compete on many subsequent Cournot spot markets with
ﬂuctuating demand. We compare the outcome of this (multi stage) Cournot market game
to the outcome of a game where ﬁrms can trade on forward markets before they make their
ﬁnal output decisions.2 We ﬁnd that total capacity in equilibrium generally decreases if
ﬁrms have access to forward markets. Our analysis has two important implications (1) The
access to strategic devices reduces the incentives to invest in capacity in an industry. Thus,
investment levels predicted under the Cournot hypothesis are generally too high whenever
ﬁrms have access to strategic devices that allow them to commit to a more aggressive
behavior (which is almost always the case).3 (2) In industries where capacity cannot easily
be adjusted at short notice, the access to strategic devices may actually increase average
prices (and thus, decrease welfare), contrary to what is predicted in the absence of capacity
constraints.
In order to develop a rough intuition for the result note that, as the spot market outcome
becomes more competitive, marginal revenue generated by an additional unit of capacity
decreases. That is, mitigating market power at the spot market makes being constrained
more attractive and consequently reduces investment. A more detailed analysis of the
problem moreover shows that also the strategic complexity of the game grows considerably
1See e.g. Newbery (1998) or Bushnell (2005).
2Alternatively, one could analyze delegation of sales, which would yield the same results.
3This is particulary important for economic modeling issues.
2with the introduction of strategic devices. In particular, for a wide range of investment levels
chosen by the ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that the subgames starting where ﬁrms choose their forward
contracts have multiple equilibria. Thus, contrary to the Cournot multistage market game
without forward contracts, uniqueness of equilibrium cannot be established.
Our research is connected to various branches of the economic literature. In recent
years, investment incentives have become focal in the policy debate on electricity markets,
which gave rise to a variety of papers analyzing this issue.4 In response to the common
perception of too low investment incentives, various mechanisms have been proposed to
raise capacities.5 However, investment incentives in imperfectly competitive markets have
been analyzed by only a few authors. Within a linear duopoly framework, Gabszewicz and
Poddar (1997) analyze capacity choices prior to Cournot competition. A general analysis
of investment under imperfect competition is provided in Grimm and Zoettl (2006). There
we show that investment incentives in oligopoly are generally too low and that they even
decrease if the spot market is regulated to a more competitive outcome. This is in line with
the result of the current paper. Notice that the eﬀect can only be found under ﬂuctuating
demand. In a model with certain demand, Murphy and Smeers (2005) show that the
introduction of a forward market does not aﬀect the investment choice compared to regular
Cournot competition. The reason is that in this case ﬁrms can exactly determine the spot
market outcome already by their investment decision.
There are some papers that identify other reasons why forward markets may not be
welfare enhancing. Liski and Montero (2004) show that if we consider an inﬁnite horizon
oligopoly, collusive outcomes can be sustained easier in the presence of forward markets.
Mahenc and Salanie (2004) show that the access to forward contracts in a Bertrand market
game with diﬀerentiated products increases equilibrium prices. As our result does, those
results put into question the welfare enhancing eﬀect of forward markets found by Allaz
and Vila (1993).
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we state the model. In section 3 we
analyze the game without forward contracts. Section 4 analyzes the game in the presence
of forward markets and compares the results of the two scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
4The sector has attracted wide attention due to shortages of transmission and/or generation capacity
that provoked serious breakdowns of electricity power supply in several countries. Among the most promi-
nent examples are the California crisis (Summer of 2000), or the great blackout which in 2003 knocked out
power to 50 million people over a 9,300-square-mile area stretching from New England to Michigan.
5see e. g. Cramton and Stoft (2005), or Bushnell (2005b) for an overview.
32 The Model
We analyze a duopoly where ﬁrms have to make a capacity choice before they compete on
a continuum of successive spot markets. Prior to production, but after capacities have been
chosen, they have the possibility to trade forward contracts, by which they commit to sell
a certain quantity on a speciﬁc spot market at a ﬁxed price. The situation we have in mind
is captured by the following three stage game:
At stage one each ﬁrm i, i = 1,2, invests in capacity xi ∈ R+, i = 1,2, at a unit cost k
(ﬁrms are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their cost of investment).
At stage two, having observed the capacity choices x = (xi,x−i),6 for each spot market
t ∈ [0,T] ﬁrms have the possibility to sell any quantity up to their capacity on the forward
market at a ﬁxed price. Forward contracts f(t) = (fi(t),f−i(t)) are sold in an arbitrage-free
market.7
At stage three ﬁrms face the capacity constraints inherited from stage one and hold the
forward positions from stage two. They simultaneously choose outputs for each spot market
t ∈ [0,T], denoted by y(t) = (yi(t),y−i(t)). Demand at time t, P(Y,t), has the functional
form8 P(Y,t) = at − Y (t), where Y (t) = yi(t) + y−i(t) is the aggregate quantity produced
by the two ﬁrms at time t, a ≥ 0, and t ∈ [0,T].Both ﬁrms have the same marginal cost
of production which is assumed to be constant. Without loss of generality we normalize
marginal cost to zero.
Firm i’s proﬁt from operating in the time interval [0,T] if capacities and forwards are




[at − (yi(t) + y−i(t))]yi(t)dt − kxi. (1)
The game we consider is a three stage game with observability after each stage. We look
for subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The assumption that spot market
quantities for the entire interval [0,T] have to be chosen simultaneously prior to t = 0 is
made for expositional simplicity. All results are still true if ﬁrms can choose production
6We denote by −i the ﬁrm other than i.
7Since we analyze the case of demand certainty we are interested in forward contracts as a strategic
device, as introduced by Allaz and Vila (1993).
8The majority of the contributions to the topic we analyze concentrate on the case of linear demand.
Examples are Fershtman and Judd (1987), Vickers (1985), Allaz and Vila (1993), or Murphy and Smeers
(2004).
9That is, fi(t) ≤ yi(t) ≤ xi for all t ∈ [0,T], i = 1,2.
4schedules for the subsequent time interval at ﬁnitely many points within the time interval
[0,T].
3 Equilibrium without Forward Contracts
In this section we analyze the game without the possibility to trade forward contracts. This
is equivalent to exogenously ﬁx forwards at f(t) = 0 for all t. Thus, we have a two stage
game where ﬁrms invest at stage one and decide upon quantities at stage two. We derive
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game by backward induction, that is, we ﬁrst solve
for the equilibria at stage two and then derive equilibrium capacity choices given that ﬁrms
anticipate equilibrium play at stage two.
Stage II First note that for given investment levels x we can solve the maximization
problem of ﬁrm i pointwisely. That is, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt as given by (1) is maximized whenever
the integrand is maximized at each t ∈ [0,T].10 Thus, an equilibrium y∗(x,t) satisﬁes
simultaneously for both ﬁrms and for each t ∈ [0,T]
y
∗
i(x,t) ∈ arg max
y
  






s.t. 0 ≤ y ≤ xi.
The above considerations imply that an equilibrium of the game at stage two,
(y∗
i(x,t),y∗
−i(x,t)), is given by the equilibrium outputs of the capacity constrained Cournot
games at each t ∈ [0,T].
Throughout the following analysis we assume that ﬁrm i’s investment is (weakly) lower
than ﬁrm −i’s. It is easy to show that the ﬁrms’ unconstrained reaction functions at time t
have the from ˜ yBR
i (y−i,t) =
at−y−i
2 and that the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium is that
both ﬁrms produce ˜ y∗
i(t) = at
3 , i = 1,2. Depending on how much the ﬁrms have invested at
stage one relative to the demand realization at time t, we have to distinguish three cases.
(CN) No ﬁrm is constrained if xi ≥ ˜ y∗
i(t) = at
3 , i = 1,2, i. e. each ﬁrm’s unconstrained
Cournot quantity is lower than its maximal possible output given the capacity choices.
Obviously, this is the case whenever 0 ≤ t ≤
3xi
a , i = 1,2. In this interval the equilib-
rium of the second stage corresponds to the unconstrained Cournot Nash equilibrium
10Any function ˆ y(t) that diﬀers from y∗(t) at a ﬁnite number of points also maximizes π. However, note






















, i = 1,2.
(Ci) Firm i is constrained if t >
3xi
a and therefore xi ≤
at
3 . In this case ﬁrm i cannot
play its unconstrained Cournot output, but will produce at capacity. As long as ﬁrm




2 . This implies that ﬁrm −i is unconstrained for all t ≤
2x−i+xi
a .




a ], in equilibrium the low-capacity ﬁrm i produces at capacity,








































(CB) Both ﬁrms are constrained for demand realizations higher than t =
2x−i+xi
a . In













i (x,t) = (at − xi − x−i)xi, i = 1,2.
As we already mentioned in section 2 the results do not change if we allow the ﬁrms
to choose production schedules at a ﬁnite number of points in time. This is obvious since
due to uniqueness of the equilibrium at stage two for each t, only playing y∗
i(x,t) satisﬁes
subgame perfection.
Figure 1 illustrates the results for a particular demand realization t.
6Figure 1: Nash equilibria at stage two of the market game without forward contracts.
Stage I For a given t, ﬁgure 1 shows which type of equilibrium exists for each given pair
of investment levels, x. Building on these results we can now derive ﬁrm i’s proﬁt from
investing xi, given that the other ﬁrm invests x−i and quantity choices at stage two are given
by y∗. A ﬁrm’s proﬁt from given levels of investments, x, is the integral over equilibrium
proﬁts at each t given x on the domain [0,T]. For each t, ﬁrms anticipate equilibrium play
at stage two, which gives rise to one of the three types of equilibria, EQCN, EQCi, or EQCB.
Note that any x > 0 gives rise to the unconstrained equilibrium if t is close enough to zero.
An increase of t corresponds to a dilation of all regions outwards with center zero. Thus, a
pair of investment levels that initially gave rise to an EQCN leads to an equilibrium where
one ﬁrm is constrained (either EQCi if x−i > xi or EQC−i if if xi > x−i) for a higher t. As
t increases even more, x ﬁnally is located in the region where both ﬁrms are constrained
(EQCB). For investment levels where both ﬁrms are constrained in the highest demand























i dt − kxi (2)
=








for xi ≥ x−i and xi ≤
aT−x−i























i dt − kxi (3)
=







for xi ≤ x−i and x−i ≤
aT−xi
2 (denoted region D).




i , implying that the proﬁt function πi(x,y∗)
is continuous for all x. Given y∗(x,t) we can now derive the equilibrium of stage one which
yields the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game.
Proposition 1 The market game where ﬁrms ﬁrst invest in capacity and then engage in
quantity competition in a continuum of spot markets has a unique subgame perfect Nash











, i = 1,2.
They produce the unconstrained Cournot best reply quantities at stage two whenever this is
possible, and at capacity otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Since the main objective of the paper is to compare the level of total investment with
and without forward markets, we deﬁne
I
NF = {x ∈ R
2






The isoinvestment line INF contains all investment levels xi,x−i leading to the same total
investment as the equilibrium of the the market game without forward contracts we analyzed
in this section. Best reply functions at stage one and the isoinvestment line are depicted in
ﬁgure 2.
11For investment levels where one ﬁrm is unconstrained at the highest demand realization the last integral





in ﬁgure 2). If both ﬁrms are unconstrained at the highest demand realization the two last integrals






8Figure 2: Best replies, equilibrium, and the isoinvestment line INF for the market game
without forward contracts.
4 Equilibrium with Forward Contracts
If we include forward markets, we have to analyze the three stage game already described
in section 2, where prior to production but after investments have been made, forwards can
be traded.
The impact of forward markets on Cournot competition has already been analyzed by
Allaz and Vila (1993). In section 4.1 we extend the analysis to the presence of capacity
constraints. In section 4.2 we will use the subgame perfect equilibria of the parameterized
subgames starting at stage two in order to characterize equilibrium investments at stage one
(prior to a continuum of Cournot markets) and compare them to equilibrium investments
in the market game without forward markets.
94.1 Forward Trading in the Presence of Capacity Constraints
Stage III In each subgame starting at stage three, ﬁrms have observed investment levels
x = (xi,x−i) and the quantities traded forward, f(t) = (fi(t),f−i(t)). Again, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt
as given by (1) is maximized whenever the integrand is maximized at each t ∈ [0,T]. Thus,
an equilibrium of stage three satisﬁes simultaneously for both ﬁrms and for each t ∈ [0,T]12
y
∗
i(x,f,t) ∈ arg max
y≥0
{(at − y − y
∗
−i)(y − fi(t))} s.t. fi(t) ≤ y ≤ xi. (5)
Note that y∗
i(t) only depends on the forwards traded for period t, f(t).
Now we solve for the equilibrium of stage three. As a ﬁrst step we ignore the capacity




at + fi − y−i
2
, i = 1,2. (6)




at + 2fi − f−i
3
, i = 1,2.










, i = 1,2.
It is straightforward to show that for each (x,f,t) the equilibrium13
{y∗
i(x,f,t),y∗
−i(x,f,t)} of stage three is unique. Depending on the values of x, f,
and t, none of the ﬁrms, one of them, or both are capacity constrained in equilibrium. We
now become speciﬁc on equilibrium quantities and proﬁt functions in each of those cases:
(CN) No ﬁrm is constrained if for both ﬁrms the unconstrained Cournot quantities given
f are lower than capacity. This holds true, whenever
xi > ˜ y
∗
i(f,t), i = 1,2. (7)
We denote by F CN(x,t) the set of all f for which both inequalities in (7) are satisﬁed
at (x,t). For all f ∈ F CN(x,t), equilibrium quantities at stage three are y∗
i(x,f,t) =
˜ y∗





(at − fi − f−i)(at + 2fi − f−i)
9
. (8)
12With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbols as in the case without forward contracts.
13Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
10(Ci) Only ﬁrm i is constrained if ﬁrm i’s unconstrained Cournot quantity given f
exceeds its capacity, but ﬁrm −i is not constrained in equilibrium. This holds true,
whenever
xi ≤ ˜ y
∗
i(f,t) and x−i ≥ ˜ y
BR
−i (xi;f,t). (9)
We denote by F Ci(x,t) the set of all f for which both inequalities are satisﬁed at
(x,t). For all f ∈ F Ci(x,t), equilibrium quantities at stage three are y∗
i(x,f,t) = xi,
y∗
−i(x,f,t) = ˜ yBR
















(CB) Both ﬁrms are constrained if they cannot play their unconstrained best reply
given the other ﬁrm produces at capacity. This holds true, whenever
xi ≤ ˜ y
BR
i (x−i;f,t), i = 1,2.
We denote by F CB(x,t) the set of all f for which both inequalities are satisﬁed at






∗,t) = (at − xi − x−i)xi, i = 1,2. (12)
Stage II Now we derive all subgame perfect equilibria of the parameterized subgames
starting at stage two. Again, given investment levels and equilibrium play at stage three,
we can solve pointwisely for the equilibria at stage two for each t ∈ [0,T].
It is important to notice that uniqueness of the equilibrium at stage three implies that
for each investment level x, the sets F CB(x,t),F Ci(x,t),F C−i(x,t), and F CN(x,t) partition
the set F = [0,xi] × [0,x−i] of all feasible levels of forward trades given x. For each set,
we can now characterize the subgame perfect equilibria (f∗,y∗). Within each set, any
equilibrium leads to unique quantities y∗ at stage three, that may, however, be supported
by various quantities of forward contracts traded at stage two. Lemmas 1 to 3 state the
equilibrium quantities, as well as the values of x for which an equilibrium exists in the
diﬀerent regions. The proofs are relegated to appendix B.
Lemma 1 (No ﬁrm is constrained)
(i) If f∗(x,t) ∈ F CN(x,t), then y∗
i(f∗(x,t),x,t) = 2at
5 , i = 1,2 (denoted EQCN).14
14That is, any equilibrium in the unbounded region yields the solution found by Allaz and Vila (1993).
11(ii) EQCN exists, if and only if xi ≥ (1 − 2
√
2
5 )at =: at
c2.3 ≈ at
2.3, i = 1,2.
Lemma 2 (One ﬁrm is constrained)
(i) If f∗(x,t) ∈ F Ci(x,t), then y∗





(ii) EQCi exists if and only if xi <
at
2 and x−i ≥
at−xi
2 .
Lemma 3 (Both ﬁrms are constrained)
(i) If f∗(x,t) ∈ F CB(x,t), then y∗
i(f∗(x,t),x,t) = xi, i = 1,2 (denoted EQCB).
(ii) EQCB exists if and only if xi ≤
at−x−i
2 , i = 1,2.
Figure 3: Subgame perfect equilibria of the parameterized subgames starting at stage two.
Lemmas 1 to 3 enable us to determine which of the four possible equilibria exist for
each given investment levels x. Note for example that for high investment levels (xi ≥ at
c2.3,
12i = 1,2), the unconstrained equilibrium exists (lemma 1). However, if investments of bidder
i are in that region but low enough ( at
c2.3 ≤ xi ≤ at
2 ), also EQCi exists (lemma 2). Thus, for
all xi ∈ [at
2 , at
c2.3] both equilibria exist, provided x−i is high enough.
Figure 3 summarizes the results of lemmas 1 to 3. The ﬁgure shows (given a particular
demand realization t) for each possible combination of investment levels, which of the four
possible types of equilibria exist.
In order to analyze all subgame perfect equilibria of the game it is necessary to determine
the proﬁt functions for all diﬀerent choices of equilibria at stages two and three. This,
however, seems to be impossible since, in regions with multiple equilibria, for each t another
equilibrium of the subgame starting at stage two can be chosen. Moreover, the selection
of equilibria of the continuation game may depend on the history of the game, that is, on
x. Note that the motivation of our analysis is to show that the consideration of investment
incentives puts into question the desirability of forward markets. Thus, for our purpose
it is suﬃcient to make our point for a reasonable class of equilibria. We consider the
following subclass of equilibria which contains all equilibria of the game where the choice
of equilibrium at stages two and three does not depend on choices of x or t.
Definition 1 (σ-subgame perfect equilibrium, SPE(σ)) A σ-sub-game perfect
equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the three stage game where in every small
interval [t,t+δ], δ → 0, the equilibrium preferred by ﬁrm i has share σ and the equilibrium
preferred by ﬁrm −i has share 1 − σ.
As we mentioned in section 2, we do not need the assumption that ﬁrms decide on y(t)
prior to t = 0. We can also allow for the choice of production schedules prior to a ﬁnite
number of time intervals. Note that the spot market equilibrium y∗(x,f,t) is unique for all t
and thus, is the only equilibrium play satisfying subgame perfection if production schedules
are chosen repeatedly (but forwards for all t are chosen prior to t = 0). In general this
does not hold true for the choice of forward quantities. Here multiplicity of equilibria leaves
scope for credible threats that may support outcomes other than f∗,y∗ for some t ∈ [0,T].
However, the σ-subgame perfect equilibria we consider do not allow for conditioning on past
equilibrium outcomes. Thus, all equilibria covered by this concept are also equilibria of the
game where forwards are chosen repeatedly prior to a ﬁnite number of time intervals.15
15Finally note that conditioning on past outcomes does not make sense in the present model since demand
realizations are ordered. Thus, the evolution of the game over time is meaningless. The model would have
to be substantially modiﬁed in order to analyze those issues.
134.2 Equilibrium Investments
Stage I Now that we have determined the equilibria of the subgames starting at stage two
for all possible capacities, we can turn towards solving the subgame perfect equilibria of the
market game with forward contracts. Figure 3 depicts the areas of existence of the diﬀerent
types of equilibria for a given value of t. A ﬁrm’s proﬁt from given levels of investments,
x, is the integral over equilibrium proﬁts at each t given x on the domain [0,T].
Note that (as in the case without forwards) any x > 0 gives rise to the unconstrained
equilibrium if t is close enough to zero. An increase of t corresponds to a dilation of all
regions outwards with center zero. Observe furthermore that in the three slices L, M, and
R (see ﬁgure 3), diﬀerent types of equilibria exist and that also their sequence is diﬀerent.
Thus, the exact form of the proﬁt function depends on the location of the investment levels
x.
Suppose for example that we want to determine bidder i’s proﬁt πi(x,f∗,y∗) from a given
pair of investment levels x, where xi > 2x−i. That is, we have to integrate parameterized
equilibrium proﬁts of the subgames starting at stage two from t = 0 to t = T given that
x is located in region L (see ﬁgure 3). In case both ﬁrms are constrained at the highest





























Starting from t = 0, any x > 0 lies in the region where only EQCN exists. Thus, the
relevant proﬁt for low values of t is πCN(x,f∗,y∗,t) as given by equation (8). That region
is left when x−i = at
2 (see ﬁgure 3), or equivalently, t =
2x−i
a . This explains the upper limit
of the ﬁrst integral.
As t becomes larger than
2x−i
a we enter into a region where multiple equilibria (of type
EQCN and EQC−i) exist. Obviously, diﬀerent selections of equilibria of the continuation
games played at each t in such a region yield diﬀerent equilibrium capacity choices at stage
one. The parameter σ determines which of the equilibria of the subgame starting at stage
two is selected at the operating stages. Firm i prefers EQCN and thus, receives share σ of
the corresponding proﬁt πCN
i . The other ﬁrm prefers EQC−i which is why ﬁrm i receives
share 1 − σ of the corresponding proﬁt π
C−i
i .
14As t increases beyond
c2.3x−i
a , ﬁrst only EQC−i exists and ﬁnally, for high values of t,
both ﬁrms are constrained, i. e. they play EQCB. This explains the fourth and ﬁfth integral
of equation (13).16
Note that in the remaining regions, M and R the proﬁt function looks diﬀerent since the
sequence of the areas of existence of the diﬀerent types of equilibria is diﬀerent (see ﬁgure 3).
In appendix C we derive the proﬁt functions for all three regions. We obtain a parameterized
proﬁt function πi(x,f∗,y∗,σ) that is continuous at all x, but not everywhere diﬀerentiable.
From this proﬁt function we derive a continuous but not everywhere diﬀerentiable upper
bound for ﬁrm i’s best reply function ¯ xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,σ).
Figure 4: The upper bound of ﬁrm i’s best reply function, xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,σ), and the
isoinvestment line INF.
16Capacity choices in region L (see ﬁgure 4) lead to a situation where both ﬁrms are constrained at the
highest demand realization. This is the case described here. For investment levels in region L, x is never
inside the region CB, such that the last integral (or the two or four last integrals) have to be dropped. See
also footnote 10.
15Now we can compare investment levels in the two market games (with and without
forward trading) by comparing ¯ xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,σ) with the isoinvestment line INF in the
market without forward contracts deﬁned by equation (4). If the best reply function lies
below the isoinvestment line for all xi ≥ x−i, no equilibrium of the game with forward
contracts can yield higher total investment than the game without forward contracts. The
result is summarized in the following
Lemma 4 The best reply function of ﬁrm i at stage one, xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,σ), yields
xBR
i (x−i) + x−i < xj + x−j for all (xj,x−j) ∈ INF whenever xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,σ) ≥ x−i.
For a detailed proof see appendix C.
Figure 4 illustrates the lemma. It depicts the isoinvestment line INF in the case without
forward markets, as well as (in the region above the 45-degree line) the upper bound of ﬁrm
i’s best reply in the presence of forward markets, ¯ xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,σ). As the latter always
lies below the isoinvestment line in absence of forward trading, we can conclude:
Theorem 1 Every SPE(σ) of the market game with forward contracts gives rise to strictly
less total investment than the unique equilibrium of the game without forward contracts.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed a market game where ﬁrms choose capacities prior to a sequence
of Cournot markets. We compared the game with and without the possibility to trade on
forward markets prior to the production stages. We have shown that in all equilibria where
in case of multiplicity the equilibrium preferred by one ﬁrm is picked at any constant rate,
investment is lower in the presence of forward markets.
The result puts into question the welfare enhancing eﬀect of strategic devices such as
forward contracts (as analyzed by Allaz and Vila, (1993)), the ﬁrms’ access to retailers, or
delegation of decisions to managers (as analyzed by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Vickers
(1985)) prior to imperfectly competitive markets. On the one hand, in the presence of
strategic devices production will be higher and prices will be lower in low demand scenarios
where ﬁrms are unconstrained. In high demand scenarios, however, production is lower (and
prices are higher) if ﬁrms have access to strategic devices since in this case they choose lower
capacities. Moreover, the presence of strategic devices gives rise to a considerable strategic
uncertainty due to multiple equilibria (compared to a unique equilibrium of the game where
16ﬁrms cannot precommit to sell a certain quantity prior to spot market interaction). An
explicit welfare comparison is beyond the scope of this paper and would be complicated by
the multiplicity of equilibria of the market game with forward contracts.
If applied to electricity markets, the result moreover touches the issue of supply secu-
rity, which requires considerable spare capacities. Currently in those markets the common
perception is that investment incentives are too low.17 Our results point out that forward
markets, even if it would turn out that they are beneﬁcial when it comes to mitigate mar-
ket power, might be undesirable, since they further decrease the already low investment
incentives.
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A Proof of Proposition 1.
In section 3 we have already analyzed the last stage of the game, where ﬁrms decide on
production levels. At the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms choose capacities, anticipating optimal produc-
tion decisions at the second stage. In the following we ﬁrst derive the ﬁrms’ best response
functions at stage one (part I), Then (part II) we solve the equilibrium of the game and
show uniqueness.
Part I First we determine the best response function of ﬁrm i.
(a) Region U = {x ∈ R2
+ : xi ≥ x−i andxi ≤
aT−x−i
2 }: In this region ﬁrm i has the
higher capacity and both ﬁrms are capacity constrained at the highest possible demand
realization. The ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrm i’s maximization problem (see equation (2) for
ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function π
U














2 is the local maximum and xmin
i the local minimum.
As ﬁrm i increases its quantity, the upper bound
aT−x−i
2 of U is reached before the proﬁt
function attains its local minimum at xmin
i . Since the (cubic) function πh
i increases towards
∞ only for values of xi above this local minimum, we obtain that π
U
i attains its maximum









18for 0 ≤ x−i ≤ x
U−out






3 is the value of x−i where x
U
i (x−i) hits the
righthandside border of region U (given by xi = x−i, see ﬁgure 2).
Region D = {x ∈ R2
+ : xi ≤ x−i andxi ≤ aT − 2x−i}. In this region ﬁrm i has the higher
capacity and both ﬁrms are constrained at the highest demand realization, i. e. x−i ≤
aT−xi
2 .
Firm i’s proﬁt function in this case is given by equation (3). By the same reasoning as above
we obtain for the maximum of πD in region D
x
D
i (x−i) = max
 
0,
2aT − 2x−i −
 







−i ≤ x−i ≤ x
D−out
















i ) is the value of x−i where x
D
i (x−i) hits the lefthandside (righthandside)
border of region D given by xi = x−i and x−i =
aT−xi
2 , respectively (see ﬁgure 2).
Region D
I
= {x ∈ R2
+ : xi ≥ aT − 2x−i andxi ≤ aT
3 }: We ﬁnally consider the case that
ﬁrm i has the higher capacity and ﬁrm −i always has excess capacity even at the highest
demand realization, whereas ﬁrm i is constrained at least in the highest demand scenario .
In this region, the proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by equation (3), however, EQCB cannot occur




a > T, we have to drop the last integral



















xi dt − kxi
=
xi(a2T 2 + x2













i (x−i) = max{0,
2aT −
√















6 } is the intersection point of
xD
I
i (x−i) and the lefthandside border of region D
I
.
Remark 1 For k ≥ aT2
4 it is always optimal for both ﬁrms to choose capacities such that
at the highest demand realization T we obtain a spot market equilibrium where both ﬁrms
are constrained. On the contrary for k ≤ aT2
4 , whenever x−i is big enough, no matter how
18Again the the ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed at the local maximum and the local minumum. Since we
reach the upper bound of region D
I
however before the local minimum is reached the solution to the ﬁrst
order condition gives the global maximum in region D
I
.





(b) It is important to notice that the equations (14), (15) and (16) form a continuous line.
Also recall that the overall proﬁt function is continuous. Thus, the continuous function
given by equations (14), (15), and (16) determines the proﬁt maximizing capacity choices
over all three regions


















(c) It remains to show that deviations outside the region U ∪D ∪D
I
are not proﬁtable for
ﬁrm i, i. e. that equations (14), (15), and (16) determine the locus of arg maxxi≥0 πi(xi,x−i).
We have to distinguish three diﬀerent cases:
(I) Region U
I
= {x ∈ R2
+ : x−i ≤ aT
3 and xi >
aT−x−i
2 }: The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by



















dt − kxi (18)
πU
I
i (x,y∗) is a linear function in xi and attains its maximum at the lowest possible
value, making a deviation into this region undesirable.
(II) Region U
II
= {x ∈ R2
+ : x−i ≥ aT
3 and xi > x−i}: The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by
equation (2), dropping its last two integrals. This proﬁt depends on xi only through
the term −kxi. Thus, it attains its maximum at the lowest possible value of xi,
making a deviation into this region undesirable.
(III) Region D
II
= {x ∈ R2
+ : xi ≥ aT
3 and xi < x−i}: The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given by
equation (3), dropping its last two integrals. The proﬁt depends on xi only through
the term −kxi. Thus, the function attains its maximum at the lowest possible value
of xi, making a deviation into this region undesirable.















i (x−i) for aT−
√
2ak













6 } ≤ x−i
(19)
20for the parameter values a > 0, T > 0, and k ∈ [0, aT2
2 ].19
Part II Now we can determine all equilibria (x∗
i,x∗
−i) of the market game without forward
contracts. We assume without loss of generality that xi ≥ x−i. (x∗
i,x∗
−i) is an equilibrium
if and only if (x∗
i,x∗
−i) is a ﬁxed point of the best reply correspondence, i. e. it satisﬁes the
following two equations:
xi =




⇔ x−i = aT − 2xi −
√




2aT − 2xi −
 









3 both equations are satisﬁed and thus, we have a symmetric
equilibrium. For xi > x−i however, g(xi) decreases with slope −2, whereas h(xi) changes



















for all xi such that h(xi) > 0 and remains constant otherwise. Thus, for xi > x−i no further






, i = 1,2
is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the market game without forward contracts.
The result is illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
B Proofs of lemmas 1 to 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1:
Part I We ﬁrst show that any equilibrium EQCN, if it exists, is given by f∗





5at, i = 1,2.
Suppose that ( ˘ f∗, ˘ y∗) is an equilibrium and that ˘ f∗ ∈ F CN(x,t). Thus, we know from
section 4.1 that at the third stage we have the unique solution ˘ y∗
i(x, ˘ f∗,t) =
at+2 ˘ f∗
i − ˘ f∗
−i
3 ,
19Investment in the market is proﬁtable only if k < aT
2
2 . At higher cost it would not even be proﬁtable
to invest for a monopolist (x−i = 0).
21i = 1,2. Since F CN(x,t) is an open set, ˘ f∗
i is a maximizer of πi(x,fi, ˘ f∗
−i, ˘ y∗,t) in some
neighborhood of ˘ f∗
i .
Since the proﬁt function of the game without capacity constraints π∞
i (f, ˘ y∗,t) = πi(xi =
∞,x−i = ∞,f, ˘ y∗,t) is concave in fi (compare equation (8) and Allaz and Vila (1993)), ˘ f∗
i
is also the global maximizer for all fi ≥ 0. Consequently, ( ˘ f∗, ˘ y∗) is the unique equilibrium






Part II Conditions for existence of the equilibrium f∗
i ( ) = 1
5at, y∗
i( ) = 2
5at, i = 1,2:




5at) ∈ F NC(x,t) if and only if xi > 2
5at, i = 1,2.
(b) However, depending on the capacity choices at stage one, fi = 1
5at might not be the
proﬁt maximizing choice of ﬁrm i given that ﬁrm −i chooses f−i = 1
5at. Recall that for
fi = 1
5at, i = 1,2, none of the ﬁrms is constrained at the production stage. Now observe
that, given that ﬁrm −i chooses f−i = 1
5at, by varying the number of forward contracts
traded, ﬁrm i can provoke a situation where either of the two ﬁrms is constrained. The














4 for 0≤ fi ≤7
5at − 3x−i (FC−i)
πCN














5at≤ fi ≤xi (FCi)
Note that the above proﬁts correspond to the proﬁts that have been derived in section
4.1 for the cases CN (no ﬁrm is constrained) and Ci, C − i (ﬁrm i/−i is constrained).
Furthermore note that if condition (a), xi ≥ 2
5at, i = 1,2, is satisﬁed, the region where
none of the ﬁrms is constrained cannot disappear. That is, given that ﬁrm −i chooses
f−i = 1
5at, ﬁrm i can always sell forwards such that both ﬁrms are unconstrained at stage
three.






3 , i = 1,2, imply that if ﬁrm i trades less forwards, its quantity
sold at stage three decreases, whereas the quantity sold by ﬁrm −i increases. Thus, if ﬁrm
−i’s capacity is suﬃciently low, a low quantity of forwards traded by ﬁrm i can provoke a
situation where ﬁrm −i is capacity constrained at stage three. This happens if ﬁrm −i’s ca-






(see equation (9)). Solving for the corresponding value of fi yields fi ≤ 7
5at − 3x−i. Thus,
for fi ∈ [0, 7
5at − 3x−i], (fi,f∗
−i) ∈ F C−i(x,t). Obviously, ﬁrm i can only provoke this
situation if x−i is low enough, i. e. x−i ∈ [2
5at, 7
15at].
22A similar reasoning explains the case that (fi,f∗
−i) ∈ F Ci(x,t). Obviously, this case can
only occur if ﬁrm i’s capacity is low enough, i. e. xi ≤ 4
5at.
It is easy to check that the above proﬁt function πi is continuous. Thus, since πCi
i is
a constant, deviation upwards, fi > f∗
i , is never proﬁtable. Furthermore, πi has two local
maxima, one at f∗
i = 1
5at and another one at f0
i = 0. Obviously f∗ is an equilibrium if and
only if f∗
i is the global maximum of πi(fi,f∗


































We conclude that (f∗





5at), i = 1,2, is a SPE of the parameterized
subgames starting at stage two if and only if xi ≥ at
c2.3, i = 1,2.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2:
Part I If there exists an equilibrium (f∗,y∗) such that f∗ ∈ F Ci(x,t), then by construction
it holds that y∗









which is maximized at f∗
−i = 0. Thus, in any equilibrium EQCi it holds that f∗
−i = 0, which





proves part (i) of the lemma.
Part II Let f∗
i = xi, f∗
−i = 0, and f′





−i) ∈ F Ci(x,t), is an equilibrium EQCi, then also (f∗,y∗), f∗ ∈ F Ci(x,t), is an
equilibrium EQCi.
We have already shown in part I that, given ﬁrm i produces at capacity, ﬁrm −i always
chooses f∗
−i = 0.
Now consider deviations of ﬁrm i. Since (f′
i,f∗
−i,y∗) is an equilibrium, deviations fi  = f′
i
cannot be proﬁtable. In particular, deviations fi ∈ (f′
i,xi] leave ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ unchanged,
since increasing the quantity contracted forward leaves ﬁrm i constrained at stage three.




−i) ∈ F Ci(x,t), is an equilibrium EQCi,




23Part III The ﬁndings of part I and II imply that whenever at least one equilibrium EQCi
of the parameterized subgames starting at stage two exists, (f∗
i ,f∗
−i,y∗) = (xi,0,y∗) is an
equilibrium EQCi (part II) and that all such equilibria give rise to the same quantities at
the production stage (part I). We now establish necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of at least one equilibrium EQCi.
(a) First, we check whether (f∗
i ,f∗
−i) = (xi,0) ∈ F Ci(x,t). In order to do so, we substitute
(f∗
i ,f∗
−i) = (xi,0) into the inequalities (9). As it turns out, f∗ ∈ F Ci(x,t) whenever
it holds that




In order to establish that (f∗,y∗) is indeed an equilibrium it remains to show that
none of the ﬁrms wants to deviate from its quantity of forwards sold given the other
ﬁrm’s choice.
(b) Let us ﬁrst consider deviations of ﬁrm −i. Since f∗
−i = 0, only deviation upwards
is possible. Note that since fi = xi ﬁrm i is committed to sell its whole capacity at
stage three (yi = xi) and as we have already shown in part I, the best ﬁrm −i can do
is to stick to f∗
−i = 0.
(c) Now we consider deviations of ﬁrm i. Since f∗
i = xi, only deviation downwards is
possible, which can lead to (fi,f∗
−i) ∈ F CN.21 Given that f∗






i ( ) =
xi(at−xi)
2 for 3xi−at
2 ≤ fi ≤xi (FCi)
πCN
i ( ) =
(at−fi)(at+2fi)
9 for 0≤ fi ≤3xi−at
2 (FCN)
It is easy to check that πi is continuous at fi =
3xi−at
2 . Furthermore note that
πCi
i (fi,f∗
−i) is a constant and πCN
i (fi,f∗
−i) is a quadratic function reaching its maxi-
mum at fi = at
4 . This implies that a deviation of ﬁrm i such that (fi,0) ∈ F CN(x,t)














2 ), i = 1,2, is a SPE of the param-
eterized subgames starting at stage two if and only if x−i ≥
at−xi
2 [from (a)] and xi < at
2
[from (c)].
21Note that for x1 ≤ 1
3at (which is the unconstrained Cournot quantity) deviation into FCN is impossible.
24B.3 Proof of Lemma 3:
Part (i) is satisﬁed by construction since f∗ ∈ F CB(x,t). In order to prove part (ii), take
any ˘ fi > 0, ˘ f−i > 0 such that ( ˘ fi, ˘ f−i) ∈ F CB(x,t).
Given ˘ f−i, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function πi(fi, ˘ f−i, ) is22









4 for 0 ≤ fi ≤ 2xi + x−i − at (FC−i)
πCB
i ( ) = (at − xi − x−i)xi for 2xi + x−i − at ≤ fi ≤ xi (FCB)
Notice that πi is continuous at fi = 2xi + x−i − at and that πCB
i is constant in fi. It
is easy to see that deviation to fi = 0 is always proﬁtable for ﬁrm i whenever it leads
to (fi = 0, ˘ f−i) ∈ F C−i. Such a deviation is impossible however if 2xi + x−i − at ≤ 0.
Accordingly ( ˘ fi, ˘ f−i) is an equilibrium if and only if
2xi + x−i − at ≤ 0 ⇔ xi ≤
at − x−i
2
, i = 1,2.
C Proof lemma 4
The proof proceeds as follows. In part I we consider the set of investment levels where
xi ≥ x−i and both ﬁrms are constrained at the highest demand realization. Within this set
we derive the investment level xi of ﬁrm i that maximizes ﬁrm i’s proﬁt given an investment
level x−i of ﬁrm −i. In part II we show that the function derived in part I is an upper bound
for the best response of ﬁrm i to a given investment level of ﬁrm −i. Finally, in part III
we show that the upper bound of ﬁrm i’s best response always lies below the isoinvestment
line (equation(4)) that contains all investment levels that yield the same total capacity
as the market game in absence forward markets. Throughout the proof we consider only
investment levels such that xi ≥ x−i, since this is suﬃcient to prove the lemma.
Part I As a ﬁrst step, we consider the region where ﬁrm i’s investment is higher than ﬁrm
−i’s and both ﬁrms are constrained at the highest demand realization, that is xi(x−i) ∈
U = {x ∈ R2
+ : xi ≥ x−i andxi ≤
aT−x−i
2 }. Within this region, we derive the investment
level xi of ﬁrm i that maximizes ﬁrm i’s proﬁt given an investment level x−i of ﬁrm −i. We
have to proceed in three steps, since ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function looks diﬀerently in the three
subregions L, M, and R (see ﬁgure 3).
22Notice if ﬁrm i reduces fi such that (fi, ˘ f−i) exits FCB, then for all values of fi ﬁrm −i will remain
constrained, since ﬁrm −i has even stronger incentives to increase it’s output at stage three.
25Region L = {x ∈ R2
+ : xi ≥ 2x−i andxi ≤
aT−x−i
2 }: Firm i’s proﬁt function
π
L
i (x,f∗,y∗,σ) is given by equation (13). Note that diﬀerentiation of π
L
i ( ) leads to the
same ﬁrst order condition as diﬀerentiation of π
U
i (equation (2)) in the case without for-
ward contracts (see appendix A). This is because all terms depending on xi coincide for
the two proﬁt functions. Thus, π
L









for 0 ≤ x−i ≤ x
L−out






2ak) is the value of x−i where x
L
i (x−i)
intersects with the righthandside border of region L, given by xi = 2x−i.




i is decreasing in xi since the local minimum is located above
the upper bound of region L given by xi =
aT−x−i
2 . Thus, for x−i > x
L−out
−i , the maximizer
x
L
i in region L is given by its lower bound x
L
i (x−i) = 2x−i.
Region M = {x ∈ R2
+ : 2x−i ≥ xi ≥
c2.3
2 x−i and xi ≤
aT−x−i
2 }: The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in



















































πCB( )dt − kxi;



































where φ(x−i,σ,k) = 2ak + 1
2σ
 









Starting at xi = 0, for a given x−i, π
M
i increases until x
Mmax
i (x−i), then decreases until
x
Mmin
i (x−i), and from there on increases to inﬁnity. Thus, x
Mmax
i is the maximizer of π
M
i
in region M, whenever x
Mmax
i ∈ M, whereas x
Mmin
i lies outside that region (in this case,
π
M
i is quasiconcave in region M).
We now show that π
M
i is quasiconcave in xi in region M for all σ ∈ [0,1] and all k.24
This is the case if x
Mmin
i (x−i) is above region M for all x−i. In order to verify this, notice
23The proﬁt in region M is derived analogously to the proﬁt in region L, see equation (13).
24Recall that at cost k > aT
2
2 even a potential monopolist would not enter the market.
26that x
Mmin


















This is above the upper bound of region M given by xi =
aT−x−i
2 , which intersects the line
xi = 2x−i at x−i = aT
5 . Since x
Mmin
i increases in x−i and since the upper bound of region
M, xi =
aT−x−i
2 , decreases in x−i, we obtain that x
Mmin
i is always above region M. Thus
the maximum of π
M






































2ak + 0.056aσ(aT 2 − 2k)
(1 + c2.3) − 0.18σ
,
are the values of x−i where x
M
i intersects with the lefthandside and righthandside border
of region M given by xi = 2x−i and xi =
c2.3
2 x−i, respectively.







i is quasiconcave in region M, the values of xi that maximize π
M
i for x−i < x
M−in
−i are
given by the lefthandside border of region M.
Region R = {x ∈ R2
+ :
c2.3
2 x−i ≥ xi ≥ x−i andxi ≤
aT−x−i
2 }: The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in region











































πCB( )dt − kxi.




































where ψ(x−i,σ,k) = 2ak + σ
50(−18ak + 9a2T 2 + 7aTx1 − (91 − 133σ
8 )x2
1).
27Similar to the analysis of region L, we can show that we always reach the upper bound
of region R, xi =
aT−x−i





Thus, in region R, π
R





























2ak + 0.056aσ(aT 2 − 2k)








450aσ(aT 2 − 2ak)
3 − 11
150σ
are the values of x−i where x
R
i intersects with the lefthandside and righthandside border of
region R given by
c2.3x−i





Summing up we can now state the maximizer over all three regions. Since πi is
continuous at all x, we obtain that the maximizer x
L∪M∪R
i (x−i) of πi in the Region
L ∪ M ∪ R = {x ∈ R2
+ : xi ≥ x−i andxi ≤ (
aT−x−i)
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x
L










i (x−i) for x
M−in





i (x−i) for x
R−in




Part II In order to establish that x
L∪M∪R
i (x−i) is an upper bound for the best reply
function of ﬁrm i it remains to show that deviations outside the region L ∪ M ∪ R are not
proﬁtable.
a) We ﬁrst analyze deviation upwards, i. e. xi ≥
aT−x−i
2 .
For xi ≥ 2x−i the proﬁt function is given by (13), adjusting, however, the limits of integra-
tion. Analogously to appendix A, part I(c), we have to drop the last integral if xi ≥
aT−xi
2
and x−i ≤ aT
c2.3, drop the last two integrals if aT
c2.3 ≤ x−i ≤ aT
2 , and drop the last four integrals




















i (x−i) is increasing in x−i, whereas the upper limit of Region R is decreasing in
x−i.
28if aT
2 ≤ x−i. That is, region L divides into three diﬀerent regions in the case of forward
markets.
In all three cases the resulting proﬁt of ﬁrm i depends on xi only through the linear
expression −kxi, which makes it optimal for ﬁrm i to choose the lowest possible value of xi
in each region. Thus, a deviation into the region where one of the ﬁrms is unconstrained
at the highest demand realization is undesirable.
b) Finally we consider a deviation downwards, i. e. xi ≤ x−i.
If deviation downwards for 0 ≤ x−i ≤ x
R−out
−i should be proﬁtable then the curve given




−i < x−i it can be veriﬁed that it is never optimal for ﬁrm i to choose
xi = x−i . In region IV, which is given by {x ∈ R2




the derivative of πIV
i at xi = x−i is given by
dπIV
i
dxi |xi=x−i = 450−11d
100a x2
−i − 3Tx−i + aT2
2 − k,
which is negative for x−i ∈ [xR−out
i , aT
3 ].26 Similarly it can be veriﬁed that the same holds
true also for x−i > aT
3 . Thus, we can conclude that for xR−out
i < x−i it is never optimal for
ﬁrm i to choose xi = x−i.
Part III Now we can show that the best reply function of ﬁrm i, xBR
i , is always below
the isoinvestment line INF for all xi ≥ x−i
An upper bound for the best reply function of ﬁrm i is ¯ xBR
i = x
L∪M∪R
i (x−i) as given by
(25). Furthermore, we have shown that for x−i > x
Rout
−i the best reply has to be below the
45-degree-line.
In order to show that the upper bound of ﬁrm i’s best reply, ¯ xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,d), given
by (25) lies below INF, we ﬁrst show that the (continuous) function ¯ xBR
i (x−i,f∗,y∗,d) is
convex in all diﬀerentiable parts.27 Thus, in order to compare ¯ xBR
i and INF it is suﬃcient
to compare the points of intersection of ¯ xBR
i and INF with the straight lines that separate
the three regions (see ﬁgure 4). We now show that at each intersection point with one of
the separating lines, the sum of investments on the best reply function in the presence of
forward contracts, ¯ xBR
i (x−i)+x−i is lower than the sum of investments on the isoinvestment
line.
The four separating lines that have to be checked are (1) x−i = 0, (2) xi = 2x−i, (3)
26Recall that aT
3 is the value of the upper bound of the region where both ﬁrms are constrained at the




























3 , where the
last expression is the total investment in the market without forward contracts. Along the
remaining separating lines, we now compare the values of x−i where ¯ xBR
i intersects with
each of the three lines and the intersection points of INF with those lines. We get



















where the last terms are the intersection points of the separating line and INF. It can
be shown28 that inequalities (2) to (4) above are always satisﬁed for the parameter space
k ∈ [0, aT2
2 ], σ ∈ [0,1], a > 0, and T > 0, which proves the lemma.




−i , and x
R−out
−i are monotone in σ.
Furthermore each inequality can be divided by aT (replacing k = aT 2k′). Then, inserting the maximizing
values of σ, veriﬁcation of conditions (2) to (4) is reduced to a one variable problem.
30